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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. 
This appeal arises out of a 1995 Opinion Letter addressed to Reed Taylor ("Taylor") 
regarding a Stock Redemption Agreement ("SRA") entered into with AIA Services Corporation 
("AIA"). The Opinion Letter was issued by Eberle, Berlin, Kading, Turnbow & McKlveen, 
Chartered ("Eberle Berlin") as counsel for AIA and at AIA's request as required by the SRA 
drafted by Taylor's personal attorneys. Richard A. Riley ("Riley") and Robert M. Turnbow, 
attorneys at Eberle Berlin at the time, prepared the Opinion Letter. Hawley Troxell Ennis & 
Hawley ("Hawley Troxell") hired Riley years later. 
While seeking to enforce the SRA in Taylor v. AJA, 151 Idaho 552,261 P.3d 829 (2011) 
("Taylor v. AJA"), Taylor turned his litigious gaze to Riley and Hawley Troxell and threatened 
suit based on the Opinion Letter. True to his threat he sued both. See Taylor v. Babbitt, 149 
Idaho 826, 243 P.3d 642 (2010) ("Taylor v. Babbitt"). After he lost that lawsuit and attorney fees 
were awarded against him for bringing a frivolous action, Taylor brought the cunent lawsuit 
based on the same Opinion Letter seeking the same damages. Riley sought a Permissive Appeal 
from the district court's ruling that the malpractice/negligence claim against Riley was not ban-ed 
by res judicata. This Comi ruled that this claim was barred by res judicata because it was, or 
could have been, brought in Taylor v. Babbitt. Taylor v. Riley, 157 Idaho 323,336 P.3d 256 
(2014) (Permissive Appeal) ("Taylor v. Riley"). 
Taylor now appeals the district court's prior dismissal of his other claims against Riley 
for negligent misrepresentation, breach of fiduciary duty, and fraud and appeals the dismissal of 
I 
his vicarious liability claims against Hawley Troxell. Amazingly, Taylor also seeks to overturn 
this Court's decision in the Permissive Appeal that Taylor's negligence/malpractice claim 
against Riley was barred by res judicata. Taylor argues that none of his claims could have been 
brought in Taylor v. Babbitt because they were not yet ripe. Taylor also claims discovery of 
"facts," nearly 17 years after the Opinion Letter was issued, prevented him from bringing his 
fraud claim in prior litigation and that both Riley and Hawley Troxell breached a duty to disclose 
these "concealed" facts after the Opinion Letter was issued. 
Riley and Hawley Troxell request this Court affirm the district comi's dismissal of 
Taylor's lawsuit on the grounds: (1) that all claims were brought, or might have been brought, in 
prior litigation (Taylor v. AJA or Taylor v. Babbitt) and are barred by res judicata or collateral 
estoppel; and (2) regardless of the application of res judicata or collateral estoppel, each claim 
fails on the merits. 
B. Course of Proceedings. 
Taylor filed his current Complaint on October 1, 2009. R. 25-50. He alleged five claims 
against Riley: (1) Negligent Misrepresentation; (2) Negligence/Malpractice; (3) Idaho Consumer 
Protection Act violations; ( 4) Breach of Fiduciary Duty; and (5) Fraud and alleged vicarious 
liability against Hawley Troxell. Id Riley and Hawley Troxell pied res judicata. R. 64; 65. 
On April 21, 2010, Motions for Summary Judgment were granted in favor of all 
Defendants dismissing the Negligent Misrepresentation and Idaho Consumer Protection Act 
2 
claims. 1 R. 1674. On May 10, 2010, Taylor's remaining claims against Hawley Troxell were 
dismissed and Taylor's Breach of Fiduciary Duty claim against all Defendants was dismissed. 
Id. On April 5, 2012, the Fraud claim against Riley was dismissed. R. 1766. On October 24, 
2012, the district court issued an Opinion and Order denying Riley's Motion for Summary 
Judgment seeking dismissal of the single remaining claim - Malpractice/ Negligence. R. 2556. 
On January 17, 2013, this Court granted Riley's Motion for Permission to Appeal the 
district court's dismissal of Negligence/Malpractice. The Notice of Appeal was filed on 
February 6, 2013. On August 27, 2014, this Comi reversed the district court's denial of Riley's 
motion to dismiss the Negligence/Malpractice cause of action: 
Mr. Taylor's claims in this lawsuit against Mr. Riley are barred by the judgment 
entered in favor of Mr. Riley in Taylor v. Babbitt. The district court erred in 
denying Mr. Riley's motion to dismiss based upon the doctrine of res judicata. 
Taylor v. Riley, 157 Idaho at 335, 336 P.3d at 268. 
Following remand, the district comi entered Final Amended Judgments in favor of Riley 
and Hawley Troxell. R. 6313-6321. On October 23, 2015, Taylor moved to reconsider the 
district court's prior dismissal of his claims against Riley and Hawley Troxell. R. 6322-24. The 
district court denied Taylor's Motion for Reconsideration. R. 6485-86. On October 29, 2015, 
Taylor filed the cmTent Notice of Appeal. 
1 Taylor has not appealed the dismissal of his Idaho Consumer Protection Act claim. 
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C. Concise Statement of Facts. 
The background and relevant facts have been examined and extensively discussed in the 
three prior appeals arising out of the SRA and Opinion Letter. See Taylor v. AJA, Taylor v. 
Babbitt, and Taylor v. Riley (Permissive Appeal). The following are pe1iinent excerpts from this 
Court's prior recitation of facts ( enclosed by quotation marks), plus additional facts pertinent to 
this fourth appeal. 
1. Facts Relevant to the 1995 Stock Redemption Agreement. 
"Reed Taylor is the founder of AIA Insurance, an insurance agency based in Lewiston, 
Idaho, which sells insurance products to fa1mers and members of various agricultural growers 
associations. Reed Taylor was the majority shareholder of AIA Services, a holding company 
which has wholly-owned AIA Insurance at all times relevant to this lawsuit. In 1995, he held 63 
percent of approximately 973,000 outstanding shares of AIA Services common stock and served 
as the Chairman of the Board of Directors and the Chief Executive Officer of AIA Services." 
Taylor v. AJA, 151 Idaho at 556,261 P.3d at 833. 
"On July 12, 1995, AIA Services Corporation (AIA Services) entered into a Stock 
Redemption Agreement with Appellant Reed Taylor to purchase all of his shares (613,494 
shares) in AIA Services for a $1. 5 million down payment promissory note, a $6 million 
promissory note and other consideration. . . . AIA Services failed to pay a $1.5 million note 
issued to Reed Taylor under the Stock Redemption Agreement when it became due on October 
20, 1995. Reed Taylor and AIA Services agreed to modify the Stock Redemption Agreement 
4 
and entered into the Stock Redemption Restructure Agreement, but thereafter, AIA Services 
failed to make certain payments that had become due under the new te1ms." Id 
2. Facts Relevant to the 1995 Opinion Letter. 
On August 15, 1995, Eberle Berlin issued an Opinion Letter at the request of its corporate 
client, AIA. R. 563. Riley and Turnbow paiiicipated in the preparation of the Opinion Letter. 
Id Taylor was the recipient of the Opinion Letter. Id Neither Eberle Berlin nor Riley 
represented Taylor in the SRA or for purposes of the Opinion Letter. Taylor was represented by 
separate counsel. 2 
3. Facts Relevant to the 2007 Taylor v. AJA Lawsuit. 
"On January 29, 2007, Reed Taylor filed suit against AIA Services,.AIA Insurance and 
John Taylor, seeking to recover the amounts owed on the two promissory notes." Taylor v. AJA, 
151 Idaho at 556,261 P.3d at 833. R. 2388-2433. 
"In April, 2008, Respondents [ AIA] filed a motion for paiiial summary judgment 
concerning the legality of the Stock Redemption Agreement, arguing that when the agreement 
was entered into, it violated the then-existing Idaho Code § 30-1-6, which authorizes 
corporations to redeem their shares but places restrictions on the source of funds used to redeem 
shares. The district comi granted paiiial summary judgment in favor of Respondents in its 
Opinion and Order dated June 17, 2009 .... " and found the SRA illegal. Id., 151 Idaho at 558, 
2 Taylor's attorney at the time was Scott Bell, an attorney with a Seattle, Washington firm. 
R. 563-564; Tr., Vol. 1, p. 70, IL 14-17. Taylor filed yet another lawsuit, this time against his 
own attorney, Mr. Bell and his law firm, for alleged nialpractice in representing Taylor in 
relation to the SRA and Opinion Letter. Tr., Vol. II, p. 56, 11. 3-7; R. 1832. 
5 
261 P.3d at 835. This Court affirmed the district court's finding that the SRA was illegal and 
unenforceable. Id., 151 Idaho at 574-575, 261 P.3d at 851-852. 
4. Facts Relevant to 2008 Taylor v. Babbitt Lawsuit. 
"On August 18, 2008, after the Underlying Case [Taylor v. AJA] had been through 21 
months of motions and hearings ... Reed filed ... actions ... against Babbitt, Ashby, Patrick 
Collins, Richard Riley, HTEH, and other unspecified attorneys who worked for HTEH based on 
its representation of the AIA Entities . . . . Reed asserted claims against Respondents [Riley, et 
al.] for: ... breach of fiduciary duties." Taylor v. Babbitt, 149 Idaho at 831,243 P.3d at 647. 
R. 620-645. 
On October 15, 2008, Taylor moved to amend his complaint in response to a motion to 
dismiss his original complaint for failure to state a claim. R. 669. In support of his motion he 
added numerous allegations relating to the Opinion Letter, including that Riley breached duties 
owed to Taylor by and through the Opinion Letter which allegedly invoked Riley's personal 
liability. R. 676-77; 697; 704-10; 713. Final judgments dismissing all claims against Riley and 
Hawley Troxell were entered March 24, 2010. Taylor v. Babbitt, 142 Idaho at 831,243 P.3d at 
647. 
5. Facts Relevant to 2009 Taylor v. Riley Lawsuit. 
On October I, 2009, while Taylor v. Babbitt was still pending, Taylor filed the present 
action, suing Riley and Hawley Troxell for a second time. R. 25. All of Taylor's present claims 
are based on duties allegedly owed to Taylor by and through the Opinion Letter. On Permissive 
6 
Appeal, this Court held that res judicata barred Taylor's negligence/malpractice claim against 
Riley. Taylor v. Riley, 157 Idaho at 335,336 P.3d at 268. 
II. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
A. Whether res judicata and/or collateral estoppel bar all claims? 
B. Regardless of the application ofresjudicata and/or collateral estoppel, whether 
each claim fails on its merits? 
C. Whether the district court abused its discretion in determining the amount of the 
award of attorney fees to Riley and Hawley Troxell? 
D. Whether Taylor is entitled to attorney fees incmred on appeal pursuant to Idaho 
Code§ 12-120(3) or§ 12-121? 
E. Whether Riley and/or Hawley Troxell are entitled to attorney fees incurred on 
appeal pursuant to Idaho Code§ 12-120(3) or§ 12-121? 
III. ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL 
A. Riley and Hawley Troxell Are Entitled to Attorney Fees on Appeal. 
This Court has held that the Opinion Letter qualifies as a commercial transaction and that 
Idaho Code § 12-120(3) applies, the district court properly awarded attorney fees, and awarded 
attorney fees on appeal. Taylor v. Riley, 157 Idaho at 339-340, 336 P.3d at 272-273. For the 
same reasons, if Riley and/or Hawley Troxell prevail on this appeal, they are entitled to attorney 
fees incurred on appeal pursuant to Idaho Code§ 12-120(3). 
B. Taylor is Not Entitled to Attorney Fees on Appeal Under Idaho Code§ 12-121. 
Taylor seeks attorney fees pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-121 under the newly amended 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54( e )(1) and the new standard set forth in Hoffer v. Scott A. 
Shappard, DO, 160 Idaho 830,380 P. 3d 681 (2016). This Court ruled in Hoffer that because 
7 
Idaho Code§ 12-121 did not contain the words "brought, pursued or defended frivolously, 
umeasonably or without foundation" that standard will no longer apply to whether attorney fees 
were owed under that statute. Id. 3 The new standard will allow attorney fees "when justice so 
requires." Id. 
Idaho Code§ 12-121 does not apply here. The application ofldaho Code§ 12-121, even 
based on the new standard, is preempted by Idaho Code § 12-120(3) as a more specific statute. 
To the extent that attorney fees are awardable under Idaho Code § 12-120(3), this should be the 
exclusive remedy and should not be superseded by or combined with Idaho Code§ 12-121.4 
IV. ARGUMENT 
A. Standards of Review. 
1. Summary Judgment. On appeal from the grant of a motion for summary 
judgment, this Court utilizes the same standard of review used by the district comi originally 
ruling on the motion. Liberty Bankers Life Ins. Co. v. Witherspoon, Kelley, Davenport, and 
Toole, 159 Idaho 679,689,365 P.3d 1033, 1039 (2016). 
3 This Comi determined that the new standard would not become effective until March l, 2017 
and will have only prospective effect, applied to all cases that have not become final as of that 
date. Id. It is unclear whether "final" means upon entry of a final judgment or after the last 
appeal. If the former, the new standard will not apply. If the latter, it will only apply if the 
appeal is decided after March 1, 201 7. 
4 To the extent this Court determines that Idaho Code§ 12-121 applies, Riley and Hawley 
Troxell request fees under that statute. If ever there was a case where justice so requires, it is 
this one. Taylor has harassed the paiiies through 1111.lltiple lawsuits and appeals for over eight 
years. 
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2. Motion to Reconsider. When a district court decides a motion to reconsider, 
"the district court must apply the same standard of review that the court applied when deciding 
the original order that is being reconsidered." Fragnella v. Petrovich, 153 Idaho 266, 276, 281 
P.3d 103, 113 (2012). When this Court reviews a trial court's decision to grant or deny a motion 
for reconsideration, it uses the same standard ofreview the lower comi used in deciding the 
motion for reconsideration. Liberty, 159 Idaho at 686, 365 P .3d at 1040. 
3. Res Judicata. Whether a prior adjudication bars a claim asserted in a subsequent 
lawsuit under the doctrine of res judicata is a question of law over which this Comi exercises 
free review. Taylor v. Riley, 157 Idaho at 330, 336 P.3d at 263. 
4. Amount of Award of Attorney Fees. "The district court's detennination of a 
reasonable amount of attorney fees is a factual determination to which this Comi applies an 
abuse of discretion standard of review." Smith v. Mitton, 140 Idaho 893, 902, 104 P.3d 367,376 
(2004). 
B. Taylor is Barred from Relitigating All Claims by Res Judicata and/or Collateral 
Estoppel. 
1. All Claims are Barred by the Final Judgment in Taylor v. Babbitt (Res 
Judicata). 
This Comi has already decided that Taylor's negligence/malpractice claim against Riley 
is barred by res judicata because it was or could have been brought in Taylor v. Babbitt. Taylor 
v. Riley, 157 Idaho at 335, 336 P.3d at 268. For the same reasons and based on the same 
analysis, Taylor's claims against Riley and Hawley Troxell for negligent misrepresentation, 
breach of fiduciary duty, fraud and vicarious liability are barred by res judicata. 
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"Res judicata prevents the same plaintiff from bringing multiple lawsuits against the 
same defendant for actions arising from the same event." Hindmarsh v. Mock, 138 Idaho 92, 94, 
57 P.3d 803, 805 (2002). Under principles ofresjudicata, a valid final judgment rendered on the 
merits by a court of competent jurisdiction is an absolute bar to a subsequent action between the 
same parties upon the same claim. Id. 
This is the third lawsuit brought by Taylor and the fomih appeal arising out of the SRA 
and the Opinion Letter. Contrary to the fundamental purposes served by res judicata, by 
bringing the present lawsuit against the same paiiies and upon the same claims alleged in Taylor 
v. Babbitt, Taylor has refused to accept the adverse resolution of the prior judicial disputes 
(especially this Cami's res judicata ruling in the Permissive Appeal), has advocated for the 
corrosive disrespect of these prior resolutions by seeking inconsistent results, has burdened the 
courts with repetitious litigation and has disregarded Riley's and Hawley Troxell's private 
interest in repose by harassing them with repetitive claims. Aldape v. Akins, 105 Idaho 254, 257, 
668 P.2d 130, 133 (Ct. App. 1983). 
Undissuaded by his loss in Taylor v. Babbitt and the award of attorney fees against him 
for bringing a frivolous lawsuit, Taylor filed the present lawsuit arising out of the SRA alleging 
wrongful conduct relating to the Opinion Letter and seeking the same damages. In the context of 
negligence/malpractice, this Comi already told Taylor that both lawsuits arose out of the same 
transaction, both lawsuits alleged claims related to the Opinion Letter, and both sought to recover 
the same damages. Taylor v. Riley, 157 Idaho at 333,336 P.3d at 266. Again undissuaded, 
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Taylor appeals the district court's dismissal of the remaining claims claims involving the same 
parties, arising out of the same transaction and seeking the same damages. 
Three elements are required for application of the doctrine ofresjudicata: (1) same 
parties; (2) same claims; and (3) final judgment. Taylor v. Riley, 157 Idaho at 331, 336 P.3d at 
264. Like Taylor's negligence/malpractice claim, each element is also met with respect to the 
negligent misrepresentation, breach of fiduciary duty, fraud and vicarious liability claims 
dismissed by the district court. 
a. The Same Parties Exist As to All of Taylor's Claims. 
The doctrine of res judicata ( claim preclusion) bars the presentation of a claim in a 
subsequent lawsuit between the same parties or their privies. Taylor v. Riley, 157 Idaho at 331, 
336 P.3d at 264. This Court found that Riley was a defendant in both Taylor v. Babbitt and this 
action. Id. Hawley Troxell was also a defendant in both actions. R. 3594. The same party 
element applies equally to Taylor's claims for negligent misrepresentation, breach of fiduciary 
duty, fraud and vicarious liability. This element is met for all claims brought in this action. 
b. Taylor's Present Claims Are the Same as Those Brought in the Prior 
Action. 
(1) All Claims Arise Out of the Same Transaction. 
The prior adjudication extinguishes all claims arising out of the same transaction or series 
of transactions. Taylor v. Riley, 157 Idaho at 331,336 P.3d at 264. Simply stated, a claim is the 
same if it arises out of the same transaction. 
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This Court held that the negligence/malpractice claim alleged in Taylor v. Babbitt and the 
claim alleged in Taylor v. Riley arose out of the same transaction or series of transactions 
(specifically the SRA and the related Opinion Letter). Taylor v. Riley, 157 Idaho at 333,336 
P.3d at 266. Taylor's present claims for negligent misrepresentation, breach of fiduciary duty, 
fraud and vicarious liability also arise out of that same transaction. 5 This element is met for all 
claims brought in this action. 
(2) Different or New Theories of Liability Do Not Preclude the Res 
Judicata Bar. 
The transactional approach to res judicata rejects the view that a claim is synonymous 
with, or limited to, a particular legal theory. 
The issue is not simply whether the two lawsuits involve the identical claim. "A 
cause of action can be ba1Ted by a prior adjudication even though the theory of 
liability ... differ[ s] from the cause of action actually litigated in the prior 
lawsuit." The issue is whether both lawsuits arose out of the same transaction or 
series of transactions. 
Taylor v. Riley, 157 Idaho at 332,336 P.3d at 265. This Court explained that "[a] subsequent 
lawsuit is not a different claim merely because the plaintiff seeks the same result under a 
different theory of liability. Under the doctrine of res judicata, claim preclusion is not limited to 
the theories that were actually litigated in the prior lawsuit." Id, 157 Idaho at 333,336 P.3d at 
266. 
5 Taylor agrees - "[t]he original transaction that spawned the lawsuits involved in.the underlying 
litigation as well as the present appeal was an illegal contract pursuant to which AIA Services 
was to redeem the shares of stock owned by Taylor .... " Appellant's Brief, p. 2. 
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In analyzing the negligence/malpractice claim in both lawsuits, this Court noted that in 
Taylor v. Babbitt, Taylor sought to recover against Riley on a different legal theory than that 
asserted in the present lawsuit. Taylor v. Riley, 157 Idaho at 333, 336 P.3d at 266. In Taylor v. 
Babbitt, Taylor based his negligence/malpractice claim on the legal theory that Riley took a 
position contrary to the opinions expressed in the Opinion Letter. Id. In the present action, 
negligence/malpractice is based on negligently preparing the Opinion Letter. Id. Neve1iheless, 
this Court determined that the present negligence/malpractice claim was barred even though it 
was based on a different legal theory than the prior claim. Id. Taylor's present claims for 
negligent misrepresentation, breach of fiduciary duty, fraud and vicarious liability are not 
different than his claims in Taylor v. Babbitt. They are the same claims based on different 
theories of liability and are barred. 
(3) Different or New Facts Do Not Preclude the Res Judicata Bar. 
"A cause of action can be ba1Ted by a prior adjudication even though the ... supporting 
evidence differ[ s] from the cause of action actually litigated in the prior lawsuit." Taylor v. 
Riley, 157 Idaho at 32, 336 P.3d at 265. 
In the Permissive Appeal, this Comi rejected the district court's determination and 
Taylor's arguments that res judicata did not apply because the prior lawsuit focused on facts 
occmring in 2007 and 2008 (taking positions contrary to the Opinion Letter) and the present 
lawsuit focused on facts occun-ing in 1995 (when the Opinion Letter was issued). Id. 157 Idaho 
at 333, 336 P.3d at 266. Despite different supporting facts and evidence from those in the prior 
lawsuit, this Court determined Taylor's present negligence/malpractice claim was barred. Id. 
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The facts and evidence supporting the present negligence/malpractice claim are the same facts 
and evidence supporting the present claims for negligent misrepresentation, breach of fiduciary 
duty, fraud and vicarious liability. All of the present claims are barred by res judicata even if the 
facts and evidence differ from those presented in the prior action. 
(4) All Damages Arising Out of the Sarne Claims are Barred. 
Res judicata not only bars all claims but also all damages arising out of those claims. 
"When a valid and final judgment rendered in an action extinguishes the plaintiffs claim ... the 
claim extinguished includes all rights of the plaintiff to remedies against the defendant with 
respect to all or any part of the transaction ... out of which the action arose." Nash v. 
Overholser, 114 Idaho 461,464, 757 P.2d 1180, 1183 (1988), (concmTing opinion)(quotingwith 
approval Aldape v. Akins, 105 Idaho at 258-59, 668 P.2d at 134-35.) A party is barred from 
bringing further claims seeking the same damage. Taylor v. Riley, 157 Idaho at 333,336 P.3d at 
266. In the Permissive Appeal, this Comi held "[i]n both cases, Mr. Taylor seeks damages for 
the same basic wrong his inability to recover the sums owing for the redemption of his stock." 
Id Taylor's claims of negligent misrepresentation, breach of fiduciary duty, fraud and vicarious 
liability also seek the same damage sums owing for the same stock redemption. These 
damages are ban-ed because they are the same damages sought in Taylor v. Babbitt. 
The "same claim" analysis and result applied to negligence/malpractice apply with equal 
force to the present claims of negligent misrepresentation, breach of fiduciary duty, fraud and 
vicarious liability and that element is met for all claims brought in this action. 
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c. There Was a Final Judgment in the Prior Litigation. 
This Court has already dete1mined there was a final judgment in Taylor v. Babbitt and 
that it met the final judgment element in the present action. Taylor v. Riley, 157 Idaho at 334, 
336 P.3d at 267. The same final judgment applies to all of Taylor's claims and the final 
judgment element is met. 
This Court's ruling that all three elements of res judicata were met to bar the 
negligence/malpractice claim applies with equal force to the remaining claims for negligent 
misrepresentation, breach of fiduciary duty, fraud, and vicarious liability. Dismissal of each of 
the claims on the grounds they are barred should be affinned. 
2. Fraud is Further Barred by Final Judgment in Taylor v. AJA (Collateral 
Estoppel). 
"Five factors are required in order for issue preclusion ( collateral estoppel) to bar the 
relitigation of an issue determined in a prior proceeding: (1) the party against whom the earlier 
decision was asserted had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue decided in the earlier 
case; (2) the issue decided in the prior litigation was identical to the issue presented in the 
present action; (3) the issue sought to be precluded was actually decided in the prior litigation; 
( 4) there was a final judgment on the merits in the prior litigation; and ( 5) the party against 
whom the issue is asserted was a party or in privity with a party to the litigation." Ticor Title Co. 
v. Stanton, 144 Idaho 119, 124, 157 P.3d 613,618 (2007). Taylor argues that collateral estoppel 
does not bar his present fraud claim because it is a different fraud claim than that raised in Taylor 
v. AJA and is.based on different (new) facts. Consequently, he argues he did not have a full and 
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fair opportunity to litigate this "different" fraud claim in Taylor v. AJA and the issues were not 
the same or actually decided in that prior litigation. 
Taylor applies collateral estoppel too nan-owly. Collateral estoppel is an issue preclusion 
doctrine rather than a claim preclusion doctrine. Taylor's present fraud claim has the same 
foundational elements (issues) as his prior fraud claim. If Taylor had a full and fair opportunity 
to litigate even one of those elements and it was actually litigated and decided in Taylor v. AJA, 
he is collaterally estopped from litigating his fraud claim in this action. Several of the elements 
(issues) of fraud were litigated and decided in Taylor v. AJA. 
Fraud requires proof of nine elements: (1) a statement of fact; (2) its falsity; (3) its 
materiality; (4) the speaker's knowledge of its falsity; (5) the speaker's intent to induce reliance; 
(6) the hearer's ignorance of the falsity of the statement; (7) reliance by the hearer; (8) the 
hearer's right to rely; and (9) consequent and proximate injury. Lettunich v. KeyBank National 
Assoc., 141 Idaho 362, 368, 109 P.3d 1104, 1110 (2005). At least three of these elements 
(issues) were decided against Taylor in Taylor v. AJA: (1) statement of fact; (2) the hearer's 
ignorance of the falsity of the statement; and (3) the hearer's right to rely. 
In Taylor v. AJA, this Cami upheld the District Cami's ruling that the Opinion Letter 
contained no statement of fact. Taylor v. AL4, 151 Idaho at 566, 261 P .3d at 84 3 (The opinion in 
the Opinion Letter "is simply an opinion based on one's interpretation oflaw and cannot form 
the basis for a fraud claim."). Taylor cam10t now relitigate this foundational issue whether 
there was a statement of fact. 
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This Court also determined that Taylor had, or should have had, knowledge of any 
alleged falsity in the Opinion Letter. 
Nothing suggests that Reed Taylor, as CEO and Chairman of the Board, as well as 
majority shareholder, was justifiably ignorant as to the circumstances causing the 
illegality - the insufficient earned surplus and absence of a shareholder vote 
explicitly authorizing the use of capital surplus. 
Reed Taylor sets forth a lengthy explanation in his brief as to how he was in no 
position to understand the circumstances surrounding the Stock Redemption 
Agreement and how AIA Services and its attorneys were in a better position to 
understand the situation and are thus more at fault. The district court ruled: "This 
is not a case where the parties to the agreement were not in pari delicto . . . If 
Reed Taylor was uninformed as to the financial status of his corporation, that was 
a voluntary choice on his part and is insufficient to make him an innocent party to 
the agreement." We agree. Reed Taylor was the majority shareholder of AIA 
Services, CEO and Chairman of the Board when he entered into the Stock 
Redemption Agreement. 
Id, 261 P.2d at 842-43. Taylor cannot relitigate that he had no knowledge of any alleged falsity 
in the Opinion Letter. Also, because Taylor had, or should have had, knowledge of any falsity, 
he had no right to rely on the Opinion Letter. 
All five factors of collateral estoppel are met as to at least three issues relating to fraud. 
Taylor had a full and fair opportunity to litigate these elements of fraud in Taylor v. AJA. These 
elements of fraud are identical in both the prior and present litigation. The issues of whether 
there was a statement of fact, whether Taylor was ignorant of the falsity of any statements of fact 
and whether he had a right to rely were actually decided in Taylor v. AJA. There was a final 
judgment on the merits in that litigation. Finally, Riley was in privity with AIA, a party to the 
prior litigation. Riley was one of AIA's attorneys. R. 563. The Opinion Letter was prepared and 
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delivered in the course of representing AIA Services and at AIA' s request. Id. Attorneys are in 
privity with their clients. Taylor v. Riley, 157 Idaho at 335, 336 P.3d at 268. 
Regardless of whether Taylor is calling his fraud claim fraudulent inducement, 
constructive fraud or fraudulent concealment, at least one of the common elements of each type 
of fraud has been decided against him. Taylor is collaterally estopped from relitigating fraud in 
the present action, however denominated. 
3. All of Taylor's Present Claims Were or Might Have Been Brought in the 
Prior Action; Each Claim Had Accrued and Was Ripe Before Taylor v. 
Babbitt Was Filed or Final Judgment Entered. 
Taylor argues that his claims were not ripe until June 17, 2009 when the district court in 
Taylor v. AJA issued its decision that the SRA was illegal. Alternatively, Taylor argues his fraud 
claim was not ripe until February 22, 2012, when he first discovered the "facts", analysis and 
reasoning underlying the 1995 Opinion Letter. Because his claims were not ripe, Taylor argues, 
he could not have brought them in the prior litigation (Taylor v. Babbitt) and consequently none 
of his claims are barred. These arguments do not save Taylor's claims from application ofres 
judicata or collateral estoppel. All of his claims were actually brought, were ripe and had 
accrued before the filing of or final judgment in Taylor v. Babbitt and nothing "discovered" in 
February 2012 was new. 
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a. Taylor's Present Claims Were Actually Brought in Taylor v. Babbitt. 
Taylor brought his cunent claims for negligence, breach of fiduciary duty, fraud and 
vicarious liability in Taylor v. Babbitt.-6 R. 620-645; 672-716. Nevertheless, he argues on 
appeal that none of these claims were ripe and, therefore, none could have been brought in that 
action. His argument is belied by his actions. Regardless of whether these claims were ripe, 
Taylor actually brought each of them in that action. It does not matter whether these claims were 
actually ripe or had any merit. See Taylor v. Riley, 157 Idaho at 334, 336 P.2d at 267 ("In 
applying the doctrine of res judicata, it does not matter that the claim against Mr. Riley based 
upon his failure to defend his Opinion Letter was patently frivolous .... ") "The fundamental 
purposes served by the doctrine of res judicata are not based upon the merits of the claim 
asserted in the prior litigation or whether it was the primary claim asserted." Id. "A party may 
set f01ih two or more statements of a claim or defense alternatively or hypothetically .... " Id 
(quoting IRCP 8(a)(2).) Taylor cannot argue that his claims could not have been brought in 
Taylor v. Babbitt. These claims were brought in that action and are baned by res judicata. 
Regardless, Taylor concedes he suffered some damage on June 17, 2009. Because no 
final judgment in Taylor v. Babbitt had been entered on that date, he could have brought his 
claims in that prior action . 
. 6 Taylor did not bring .his current claim for negligent misrepresentation in Taylor v. Babbitt. 
· Neve1iheless, he might have and should have because it is a claim arising out of the sari1e 
transaction involving the same pmiies and seeking the same damages. 
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b. Taylor's Claims Accrued Before Final Judgment in Taylor v. Babbitt 
(3/24/10). 
Taylor concedes that he suffered some damage on June 17, 2009 when the illegality 
decision was entered, and, based on that date, argues that his present claims for negligence/ 
malpractice, negligent misrepresentation and breach of fiduciary duty accrued as of that date and 
could not be brought in Taylor v. Babbitt. Appellant's Brief, p. 16. Taylor v. Babbitt was still 
pending on that date. There was no final judgment until March 24, 2010. Taylor v. Riley, 157 
Idaho at 330, 336 P.3d at 263. Because Taylor v. Babbitt was still pending, Taylor could have 
brought these claims in that action even using his accrual date. 
Rule 11 (a)(2)(B) states that a motion for reconsideration of any interlocutory order of the 
trial court may be made at any time before entry of final judgment, but not later than fourteen 
(14) days after entry of final judgment. I.R.C.P., Rule 1 l(a)(2)(B). A dismissal of a complaint is 
an interlocutory order until a final judgment or Rule 54(b) ce1iificate is signed. Idaho First 
National Bank v. David Steed & Associates, Inc., 121 Idaho 356, 361, 825 P.2d 79, 84 (1992). 
Rule I l(a)(2)(B) provides express authority for a trial comi to reconsider and vacate 
interlocutory orders. Telfordv. Neibaur, 130 Idaho 932,934,950 P.2d 1271, 1273 (1998). A 
trial comi can consider new facts or evidence upon a motion for reconsideration. Johnson v. 
Lambros, 143 Idaho 468, 471-72, 147 P.3d 100, 103-4 (Ct.App. 2006). The district comiretains 
jurisdiction to rule upon a motion for reconsideration, even during the pendency of an appeal. 
I.A.R. l 3(b )(7). 
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Taylor could have filed a motion for reconsideration of the dismissal of his complaint in 
Taylor v. Babbitt to allow him to plead these "new" claims. He could have done so up to and 
including fourteen (14) days after entry of final judgment on March 24, 2010. Taylor had more 
than nine (9) months after Judge Brudie's June 17, 2009 ruling to bring these claims in Taylor v. 
Babbitt and his failure to do so bars him from relitigating those claims in this subsequent 
litigation. 
Taylor argues, however, claims that accrue after the prior litigation is filed are not claims 
that could have been brought in the prior litigation even if they accrue during its pendency. There 
is no Idaho case law supporting the filing date as the cutoff for determining whether a claim 
might have and therefore should have been brought in prior litigation. The Idaho cases relied on 
by Taylor do not support this contention and both can be easily distinguished. 7 
In Duthie v. Lewiston Gun Club, 104 Idaho 751,754,663 P.2d 287,290 (1983), this 
Comi held that matters raised in a second suit were not ripe for adjudication in the first suit when 
"facts occmTed subsequent to the first trial [] led to the filing of the second suit." Id. In the first 
7 Taylor also relies on two additional cases from non-controlling jurisdictions - Allied Fire 
Protection v. Diede Const., Inc., 127 CaL App. 4th 150, 155 (2005) and Los Angeles Branch 
NAACP v. Los. Angeles Unified School Dist., 750 F.2d 731, 739 (9th Cir. 1984) - for the 
proposition that "the bar of res judicata is 'framed by the complaint at the time it is filed."' 
Appellant's Brief, p. 16. The Idaho Supreme Comi, however, has squarely rejected this 
approach. See Duthie v. Lewiston Gun Club, 104 Idaho 751,753,663 P.2d 287,289 (1983) ("In 
reviewing this issue, the trial court held that res judicata applies only to issues raised by the 
pleadings .... [W]e disagree with the trial comi's finding that res judicata applies only to issues 
raised by the pleadings. . . . Therefore, not raising the issue in the pleadings is not grounds for 
denying the motion [to bar a claim on res judicata grounds] because ... res judicata applies to 
every matter which might and should have been litigated in the first suit whether or not it was 
raised in the pleadings."). 
21 
suit, the district court dismissed the action based on its finding that the Duthies had a license to 
hook up to the Gun Club's waterline and therefore could not be trespassers. A few months after 
the first suit was resolved, the Gun Club cut and capped the waterline, effectively revoking the 
Duthies' license. The Duthies then filed the second suit against the Gun Club and argued that the 
Gun Club should be precluded from arguing that the license was revoked, because that issue 
should have been raised in the first action. This Cami affirmed the district court's decision 
rejecting the Duthies' argument. This Court reasoned that the facts that occmTed subsequent to 
the first trial - "i.e., the cutting and capping of the waterline" "triggered the filing of the second 
suit." Id. Consequently, neither the Duthies' claim that their license was improperly revoked nor 
the facts used to support that claim (the cutting and capping of the waterline) existed during the 
pendency of the first lawsuit and, indeed, that new claim could not have been brought until the 
second suit. 
The second Idaho case relied on by Taylor, Bell Rapids Mutual Irrigation Co. v. 
Hausner, 126 Idaho 752, 754, 890 P.2d 338, 340 (1995), is also distinguishable. In the first suit, 
Bell Rapids sued Hausner to collect certain unpaid operating and maintenance fees leveled 
against her from 1988 through 1991. The district comi found in favor of Hausner, ruling that the 
fees were "illegal and uncollectable." Bell Rapids did not appeal. In September of 1993, Bell 
Rapids sued Hausner again this time to collect the operating and maintenance fees for 1992. 
The Court applied Duthie ("Applying the Duthie test of the time of trial as the time to determine 
ripeness .... ") and held that the second claim (for the 1992 fees) did not become ripe until 
sometime after the first suit was submitted to the trial court, and accordingly, the second claim 
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was not barred by claim preclusion. Bell Rapids, 126 Idaho at 754, 890 P.2d at 340. The Court 
reasoned that the first case was submitted to the district court in January 1992, but that the major 
p01iion of the 1992 operating and maintenance fees did not become due until April 1, 1992. Id. 
These cases stand for the common sense proposition that when new facts occur after a 
case is finally resolved and those new facts trigger a new claim, that new claim is not necessarily 
precluded by res judicata. But this general rule is inapposite here. In both Duthie and Bell 
Rapids, new facts that occurred after resolution of the first case triggered claims that did not 
previously exist. Here though, we have only "new facts" offered in support of the same tired 
claims that were previously brought in Taylor v. Babbit and Taylor v. AJA. In stark contrast to 
the circumstances presented in Duthie and Bell Rapids, the so-called "new facts" alleged by 
Taylor, did not trigger new claims or the filing of the second suit. Rather, the second suit (Taylor 
v. Riley) was already two-and-a-half years old when these "new facts" were "discovered" in 
February or March of 2012 and they related to claims already existing. Simply put, Duthie and 
Bell Rapids have no applicability to the present case. 
Asse1iing that his claims for negligence/malpractice, negligent misrepresentation, and 
breach of :fiduciary duty did not accrue until June 17, 2009, after Taylor v. Babbitt was filed, 
does not save Taylor's claims from the res judicata bar. Final judgment in the prior litigation is 
what bars subsequent claims. These claims ripened, based on Taylor's own accrual date, before 
final judgment in the prior litigation. Taylor could have brought these claims in Taylor v. 
Babbitt. His failure to do so precludes him from relitigating them in this action. 
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Alternatively, June 17, 2009 is not the date his claims ripened. Taylor's argument that 
his claims did not ripen until the SRA was determined to be illegal assumes that there must be an 
adverse ruling in a prior action dete1mining that the foundational agreement is invalid before a 
claim ripens. A claim against an attorney opinion-giver does not, however, ripen only after the 
underlying transaction is dete1mined to be invalid and, consequently, can be brought before an 
adverse ruling. For example, in Sirote & Permut, P.C. v. Bennett, 776 So.2d 40 (Ala. 2000), the 
court held that the claims of the purchasers of revenue bonds against the attorneys who issued 
opinion letters regarding the validity and enforceability of the bonds ripened when they 
purchased the bonds, not when the bonds were later held by a court to be invalid. Id 776 So.2d 
at 45. In Mark Twain Kansas City Bank v. Jackson, Brouillette, Pohl & Kirley, P.C., 912 
S. W.2d 536 (Mo.App. 1995), the plaintiff sued a law firm for negligence in the preparation of an 
opinion letter while underlying litigation regarding the validity of a real estate loan was still 
pending. Id 912 SW2d at 540. In Mega Group, Inc. v. Pechenik & Curro, P.C., 819 N.Y.S.2d 
796 (2006), the plaintiff was allowed to file suit against attorneys who gave an opinion regarding 
the legality of the sale of corporate stock even though litigation over the legality of the stock sale 
was still pending and had not been resolved. Id. 819 N.Y.S.2d at 798. Taylor's claims ripened 
before the adverse ruling in Taylor v: AJA. 
This Court also rejected the argument that a claim is not ripe until the judge makes an 
adverse ruling in the prior litigation. In Berkshire Investments LLC v. Taylor, 153 Idaho 73, 83, 
278 P.3d 943, 953 (2012), this Court barred numerous claims that were raised in prior litigation. 
Id. 513 Idaho at 82-83, 278 P.3d at 952-953. This Court also barred other claims because they 
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stemmed either from the same transaction (the sale ofreal property) or the subsequent lawsuit 
over that transaction. Id. The Mailes argued, as Taylor does here, that these latter claims were 
not ripe until the alleged misrepresentation resulted in Judge Wilper's adverse judgment. Id. 
This Court noted that "[a]ll of the conduct on which those claims are based - the execution of the 
Disclaimer, the filing of the Taylors' petition for appointment as trustees, and the filing of the 
amended complaint occuned and was made known to the Mailes while [the prior litigation] 
was pending, before Judge Wilper even proceeded to the merits of the case." Id. A party cannot 
await an adverse ruling before asse1iing a cause of action, if the operative facts are known. See 
Id 
Finally, the adverse judgment rule espoused by Taylor does not apply. This "adverse 
judgment accrual rule" has been limited to situations in which the claimant is the defendant in 
the underlying litigation. Bluewater Partners, Inc. v. Edwin D. Mason, Foley and Lardner, 975 
N.E.2d 284, 301 (Ill.App. 2012). Under the adverse judgment accrual rule, "[p]ublic policy 
favors such a delay to permit a detennination as to whether the advice of counsel was in fact 
negligent. If the malpractice plaintiff is found not liable in the underlying suit, then the favorable 
detennination of the suit forecloses the element of damages." Bluewater, 975 N.E.2d at 301 
( citation omitted). The rule is otherwise, however, where the claimant is the plaintiff in the 
underlying litigation. Id 
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Taylor was the plaintiff in the action in which the adverse ruling was made. 8 Applying 
Bluewater and Berkshire, Taylor's claims against Riley and Hawley Troxell ripened, at a 
minimum, contemporaneously with his challenge to the illegality defense. He did not have to 
await an adverse decision before bringing his present claims in Taylor v. Babbitt. All of Taylor's 
claims could have been brought before the adverse ruling on June 17, 2009. 
Regardless of the June 17, 2009 date, and even if the filing date of the prior action is the 
cutoff date for determining whether res judicata bars "new" claims, all of Taylor's claims 
accrued and were therefore ripe before Taylor v. Babbitt was filed. 
c. Taylor's Claims Accrued Before Taylor v. Babbitt was filed (08/18/08). 
Taylor argues this Court used the wrong accrual date (April 16, 2008) when it held that 
his negligence/malpractice claim was baned and that, because his claims did not accrue until 
June 17, 2009 (when the illegality decision was entered), none of his claims are baned. 
(1) The April 16, 2008 Date of Accrual is the Law of the Case. 
In the Permissive Appeal, this Comi held that at the time Taylor filed Taylor v. Babbitt, 
"he had a cause of action against Mr. Riley for his alleged negligence in issuing the Opinion 
Letter" based on the district court's determination that it accrued in April 2008. 9 Taylor v. Riley, 
157 Idaho at 333, 336 P.3d at 267. That Taylor's negligence claim against Riley accrued in 
April 2008 is the law of the case and applies to all of his tort based claims. 
8 This distinguishes Buxton and makes it inapplicable here. In Buxton, the malpractice claimant 
(City of McCall) was the defendant in the underlying construction litigation. Buxton, 146 Idaho 
656, 657-658, 201 P.3d 629, 630-631 (2009). 
9 This is the date when a motion for partial summary judgment was filed in Taylor V. AJA 
asserting the SRA was an illegal contract. Taylor v. Riley, 157 Idaho at 329, 336 P.3d at 262. 
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The law of the case doctrine provides that "upon an appeal, when the Supreme Comi, in 
deciding a case presented, states in its opinion a principle or rule of law necessary to the 
decision, such pronouncement becomes the law of the case, and must be adhered to throughout 
its subsequent progress, both in the trial court and upon subsequent appeal .... " State v. 
Hawkins, 155 Idaho 69, 72,305 P.3d 513,516 (2013). Moreover, "the law of the case generally 
prevents consideration on a subsequent appeal of alleged errors that might have been, but were 
not, raised in an earlier appeal." State v. McCabe, No. 43430, 2016 WL 4585876, at* 1 (Idaho 
Ct. App. 2016). "Idaho cases establish that the application of the [law of the case] rule is 
mandatory" as opposed to discretionary. Swanson v. Swanson, 134 Idaho 512,518, n. 3, 5 P.3d 
973, 979 n. 3 (2000). 
This Court found that Taylor's negligence/malpractice claim accrued in April 2008. This 
accrual date must be adhered to throughout this subsequent appeal. Taylor cannot relitigate 
whether his negligence/malpractice claim against Riley accrued in April 2008. The law of the 
case should also preclude him from relitigating that accrual date in relation to his claims of 
negligent misrepresentation and breach of fiduciary duty. If April 2008 applies as the accrual 
date of Taylor's tort based claims (negligence/malpractice, negligent misrepresentation and 
breach of fiduciary duty), each was ripe and could have been brought in Taylor v. Babbitt before 
it was filed. 
27 
(2) Some Damage Occurred Prior to Taylor v. Babbitt When Taylor 
Incurred Attorney Fees Responding to the Illegality Defense. 
AA ... ccrua! of tort-based claims has historically been determined under the "some damage" 
rule. 10 Reynolds v. Trout, Jones, et al., 154 Idaho 21, 24,293 P.3d 645,648 (2013). A cause of 
action cannot accrue until there is objective proof that some damage has occurred. Id Taylor 
argues that the attorney fees he incurred responding to the illegality defense was not some 
damage for purposes of accrual of his to1i based claims. 
In the Permissive Appeal, this Comi affirmed the district comi's holding that 
"Mr. Taylor's cause of action against Mr. Riley based upon the issuance of the Opinion Letter 
accrued in April 2008 when he was required to incur attorney fees to counter the claim that the 
Stock Redemption Agreement was an illegal contract." Taylor v. Riley, 157 Idaho at 333, 336 
P.3d at 267. This holding necessarily implies that incurring these attorney fees was some 
damage. As discussed supra, some damage occuned in the form of attorney fees responding to 
the illegality defense and is law of the case and should be applied to the other claims. 
Regardless, some damage occurred when the illegality defense was first asserted. 
The illegality defense was first asse1ied on April 16, 2008. Taylor v Riley, 157 Idaho at 
329, 336 P.3d at 262. Taylor incurred attorney fees responding to those illegality allegations. 
10 The some damage rule does not apply to Taylor's fraud claim, which will be addressed infra. 
The four year statute of limitations found in Idaho Code § 5-224 applies to breach of fiduciary 
duty. See Jones v. Kootenai County Title Ins. Co., 125 Idaho 607, 873 P.2d 861 (1994). It is 
unclear whether the "some damage" rule applies to this statute but, for purposes of this analysis, 
it is assumed that it does. There is no case law establishing what statute of limitations applies to 
negligent misrepresentation but, again, the some damage rule is assumed to apply. 
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, 157 Idaho at 333, 336 P.3d at 266. These attorney fees were incurred prior to filing Taylor v. 
Babbitt. Some damage was suffered when Taylor incuned attorney fees responding to the 
illegality defense. 
Taylor also suffered some damage in the form of different attorney fees and costs because 
of Riley's alleged wrongful acts. 
If Riley had disclosed these facts to Taylor and/or Idaho courts before or during 
the AIA litigation, much of the time and expense associated with the discovery 
disputes involved in those lawsuits could have been avoided. 
Appellant's Brief, p. 38. Taylor testified as follows: 
Over the course of the next several years, I was forced to file two additional 
lawsuits ("Taylor v. McNichols" [and Taylor v. Babbitt]) and spend hundreds to 
thousands of dollars paying attorney's fees, expe1i witness fees, costs and 
judgments entered against me (and attorney fees awarded against me). I incurred 
well over $1,200,466 litigating over issues caused [by the] illegal 1995 
redemption of my shares. 
R. 6353. Taylor incurred some damage in the form of attorney fees, expert fees, costs and 
judgments to respond to the illegality defense and to litigate various lawsuits arising out of the 
SRA and the Opinion Letter, including Taylor v. AJA commenced in 2007. 
(3) Some Damage Occurred Before Taylor v. Babbitt When Taylor 
IncmTed Attorney Fees Asse1iing Various Breaches of Duties That 
Did Not Depend On the Outcome of the Illegality Defense. 
Months before Taylor v. Babbitt was filed, Taylor asse1ied wrongful conduct against 
Riley and Hawley Troxell, including breach of various duties owed to him because they took a 
position contrary to the representations made in the Opinion Letter, failed to assist him to prove 
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that the SRA was not illegal, prevented him from deposing Riley, and took other actions that 
thwaiied his effo1is to collect sums owed to him under the SRA. R. 377, 379-382. 
On July 21, 2008 Taylor threatened, through his attorney, to sue Riley and Hawley 
Troxell for taking positions contrary to the Opinion Letter. Taylor demanded that the AIA Board 
of Directors sue Riley and Hawley Troxell for, among other things: "representing AIA Services 
and/or AIA Insurance in making inappropriate arguments (including alleged illegality of the debt 
to Reed) knowing that such arguments were counter to AIA Services' obligations to Reed and 
Donna and knowing that Richard Riley was a witness who provided a legal opinion counter to 
such arguments." R. 379-382. On August 5, 2008, Taylor, through his attorney, threatened to 
sue Riley and Hawley Troxell based on, among other things, the Opinion Letter and taking 
contrary positions: 
Explain to Mr. [Merlyn] Clark how Richard Riley issued an opinion letter to Reed 
[Taylor] and you are not t[r]ying to disingenuously argue the $8.5 million is not 
owed to him ... Explain to Mr. Clark that even if the illegality argument had 
merit, Donna Taylor and Reed Taylor would be suing Hawley Troxell (and 
Richard Riley) in such an instance regardless of the circumstances. 
R. 377 (underlining and parenthetical in original). See also Taylor v. Riley, 157 Idaho at 329-
330, 336 P.2d at 262-263. Before Taylor v. Babbitt was filed, Taylor was encouraging a lawsuit 
against Riley and Hawley Troxell by AIA and personally threatening a lawsuit based on taking 
positions contrary to the Opinion Letter and acknowledging that these suits would be brought 
regardless of the outcome of the illegality doctrine. 
Taylor also alleged that, after he filed Taylor v. AJA to recover the sums he was owed but 
before Taylor v. Babbitt was filed, Riley and Hawley Troxell "took various actions which 
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thwarted his attempts to recover the sums to which he was entitled under the Stock Redemption 
Agreement." Taylor v. Riley, 157 Idaho at 332,336 P.3d at 265. 
Those alleged actions included assisting in stopping payments owing under the 
Stock Redemption Agreement; participating in a joint defense agreement, which 
their clients entered into with other defendants; obtaining and maintaining a 
restraining order and preliminary injunction that prevented him from voting the 
stock of AIA Insurance, Inc., in which he had a security interest to secure 
payment of the sums due under the Stock Redemption Agreement; and taking 
actions that caused the values of the two corporations to plummet, to the 
detriment of Mr. Taylor as the major creditor. 
Id This conduct, all of which occurred before Taylor v. Babbitt, was alleged by Taylor to 
constitute willful interference with property and money which belonged to and/or should have 
been under his possession and/ or control and these actions deprived him of possession of such 
prope1iy and money. Id., 157 Idaho at 332-333, 336 P.3d at 265-266. These pre-Taylor v. 
Babbitt wrongful acts were alleged to have constituted professional negligence and/or breach of 
fiduciary duties which conduct damaged Taylor. Id. at 333, 266. These wrongful acts were 
based on litigation conduct in Taylor v. AJA and formed a basis for the claims brought in Taylor 
v. Babbitt. 
Taylor, through his attorney, conceded that Taylor suffered damage based on attorney's 
litigation conduct, before Taylor v. Babbitt was filed. R. 3257. The damages identified by 
Taylor as having been suffered were his inability "to take possession of the collateral, funds have 
continued to be used inappropriately, and business decisions made that were not approved by 
Reed Taylor." Id 
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This conduct did not become wrongful because Taylor later lost the illegality issue. That 
alleged wrongful conduct existed regardless of the outcome of the illegality defense. That 
alleged wrongful conduct would have been wrongful even if the SRA was deemed legal and 
enforceable. Taylor acknowledged that the alleged wrongful conduct existed regardless of the 
outcome of the illegality defense. That alleged wrongful conduct was based on or related to the 
Opinion Letter. Consequently, before Taylor v. Babbitt, Taylor had breach of duty claims 
independent of the subsequent illegality decision in Taylor v. AJA. This was proven when Taylor 
sued Riley and Hawley Troxell in Taylor v. Babbitt based on this wrongful conduct before the 
illegality decision was issued. 
Taylor incmTed attorney fees and non-attorney fee damage asserting this wrongful 
conduct and threatening suit against Riley and Hawley Troxell, and as a result of this alleged 
misconduct. These attorney fees constitute some damage suffered by Taylor before Taylor v. 
Babbitt was filed. Based on this damage, Taylor's tort based claims ripened before the prior 
litigation was filed. 
( 4) Some Damage Occurred Because of the Opinion Letter when 
Taylor Entered into the SRA. 
Taylor has alleged in prior litigation and argues now on appeal that, if the allegedly 
concealed facts, analysis and reasoning underlying the Opinion Letter had been made known to 
him before he entered into the SRA, he would not have elected to sell his shares or would have 
voted his shares to authorize the proper funds. 
[I]f Mr. Riley's Opinion Letter had been correct, I would have either voted my 
shares to authorize the transaction under Idaho Code § 30-1-6 or I would have 
32 
simply kept my shares and ran off the commissions generated on the policies that 
had already been sold. Either way, I would have obtained the $6,000,000 owed to 
me for my lost shares and unenforceable $6M Note. I would not have incurred 
any of the damages set forth above had Mr. Riley's Opinion Letter been correct or 
had it provided the necessary disclosures and reasoning for his opinions. 
R. 6352-53; 6375. Taylor claims he would not have sold his shares without the Opinion Letter 
or would have voted his shares if ce1iain disclosures had been made. R. 6351. He admits he 
suffered damages when he sold his shares in reliance on the representations in the Opinion Letter 
and failure to disclose the facts necessary to make it not misleading. Id. Taylor suffered some 
damage as a result of Riley's alleged wrongful conduct when he relinquished his shares in 199 5. 
Alternatively, Taylor argues that had Riley advised him that the redemption did not 
comply with the statutes or provided him with his reasoning why he felt the transaction was 
legal, he would have "called a shareholder meeting and voted my shares to approve a shareholder 
resolution or amendment to the Articles of Incorporation to authorize the use of capital surplus in 
compliance with Idaho Code§ 30-1-6." R. 6352. The SRA was determined to be illegal because 
there was insufficient earned surplus and there was no shareholder resolution or amendment to 
the Articles of Incorporation to authorize the use of capital surplus to redeem Taylor's shares. 
Taylor v. AJA, 151 Idaho at 565,261 P.3d at 842. Taylor argues that because Riley failed to 
make these disclosures, Taylor lost the opp01iunity to cure the illegality of the SRA. This loss of 
opportunity represents some damage. 
In Buxton, this Comi determined that lost opp01iunity was sufficient damage to trigger 
the accrual of ce1iain claims. Buxton, 146 Idaho at 663,201 P.3d at 636. The City of McCall 
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alleged that its attorneys negligently advised the City to release its claims against J-U-B on July 
25, 2002. This Court held: 
That was the date on which the City lost its opportunity to recover against J-U-B, 
and the date on which the damage occurred if the Attorneys negligently advised 
the City to release J-U-B from liability .... 
Id The City of McCall also alleged that its attorneys negligently advised the City not to accept 
an offer to settle and the City rejected the offer in September 2003. Id. This Court determined 
that was the date when the City suffered objectively ascertainable damage from the alleged 
negligence of its attorneys because it "lost its opportunity to settle this case for that amount." Id. 
Here, like in Buxton, Taylor lost an oppmiunity based on Riley's alleged negligence to cure the 
illegality of the SRA. Taylor suffered damage in 1995 (long before Taylor v. Babbitt) when he 
sold his shares pursuant to the SRA and lost the oppo1tunity to make the SRA legal. 
(5) Some Damage Is Not the Trigger for Accrual of Tort-Based 
Claims. 
The term "some damage" does not appear in the statutes oflimitation applicable to tort-
based claims. See Idaho Code§ 5-219(4) and§ 5-224. It is a judicial construct. In Hoffer, this 
Court recognized that the phrase "frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation" is not 
language found in Idaho Code§ 12-121. Id., 160 Idaho at __ , 380 P.3d at 695. Based on the 
absence of this language, this Court ove1turned decades of precedent and established that 
attorney fee awards must be made under the literal words of that statute and not based on words 
that did not appear in it. Id Consistent with Hoffer, Idaho Code§§ 5-219(4) and 5-224 also 
should be interpreted based on its literal words. Neither contains the words ":;ome damage." 
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It is up to the legislature to determine if the term "some damage" should be added to the 
statute. See Stephens v. Stearns, 106 Idaho 249,259,678 P.2d 41, 51 (1984) (J. Bakes dissent) 
("The majority does not deny, however, that the legislature has the power to commence the 
accrual of a cause of action prior to any damage occurring. Indeed, the majority acknowledges 
as much by stating, ante at 46, that while the general rule is that '"the statute of limitations does 
not begin to run against a negligence action until some damage has occurred ... ' the legislature 
has modified this general rule by enacting LC.§ 5-241 [which] section causes accrual only if 
one's cause of action has not accrued prior to six years after completion of construction."). 
As Justice Bakes recognized, the legislature can provide that a claim accrues before 
injury or before "some damage" occurs. See Idaho Code § 5-241. That statute provides that tort 
claims relating to construction of real property shall accrue and begin to run six years after final 
completion. Id For instance, a claim for professional malpractice in a construction design 
setting must be brought no later than eight years following the completion of construction 
regardless of whether "some damage" has been suffered. See Barab v. Plumleigh, 123 Idaho 
890, 893, 853 P.2d 635,638 (Ct.App. 1993). See also West v. El Paso Products Co., 122 Idaho 
133, 136, 832 P.2d 306,309 (1992). Consequently, if a person falls down a negligently designed 
flight of stairs nine years after the stairs were completed, thus suffering some damage, the claim 
against the architect is barred (i.e., the trigger is not when "some damage" occurred). 
Consistent with Hoffer, the statutes of limitation applicable to negligence, negligent 
misrepresentation and breach of fiduciary duty should be applied as written and without 
reference to some damage. Here, the occurrence, act or omission complained of occurred in 1995 
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when the Opinion Letter was issued. That was when the alleged negligence occurred. That was 
when the alleged non-disclosure occurred. The time within which Taylor was required to bring 
his current negligence-based claims expired in 1997. Dismissal of these claims can be based on 
the alternative grounds that the applicable statute of limitations expired prior to filing the present 
suit. 
b. Taylor's Fraud Claim Accrued Before Final Judgment in Taylor v. 
Babbitt. 
The statute of limitation for fraud, constrnctive fraud and fraudulent concealment is three 
years and accrnes upon discovery, by the aggrieved party, of the facts constituting fraud. Idaho 
Code§ 5-218(4). Taylor claims he did not discover facts, analysis or reasoning underlying the 
Opinion Letter that allegedly would have made it not misleading until February 22, 2012. In 
order for Taylor to escape the bar ofres judicata on his fraud claim he has to show he had no 
knowledge, actual or constructive, of the facts constituting fraud before final judgment in Taylor 
v. Babbitt was entered. Taylor knew facts sufficient to bring fraud long before Taylor v. Babbitt 
was filed. 11 
Taylor's fraud claims are based on allegations that Riley concealed the following: 
1. He intentionally deviated from the plain meaning of earned surplus under 
Idaho Code § 30-1-6; 
2. He believed the transaction and Opinion Letter were c01Tect; 
3. The representation that all necessary shareholder consents had been 
obtained was based on Riley's belief that AIA had sufficient earned 
surplus; 
11 That Taylor has sufficient facts necessary to allege fraud before Taylor v. Babbitt was filed is 
proven by the fact that he alleged fraud in connection with the Opinion Letter in Taylor v. AJA 
and actually brought an Opinion Letter fraud claim in Taylor v. Babbitt. 
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4. He relied upon "fair value" to opine that AIA had sufficient earned surplus 
to purchase Taylor's shar.es; 
5. He believed shareholder approval was not required to comply with Idaho 
Code § 30-1-6; and 
6. He failed to disclose the analysis and research in reaching for his opinions. 
Appellant's Brief, pp. 36-37. 
(1) Taylor Had Actual Knowledge of the Alleged Concealed Facts 
Before Final Judgment in Taylor v. Babbitt. 
This Court has already determined that Taylor had actual knowledge of the facts 
constituting fraud long before Taylor v. Babbitt. See Taylor v. AJA Services, 151 Idaho at 565, 
566,261 P.3d at 842, 843. Taylor's present fraud claim is based on an allegedly misleading 
Opinion Letter that the SRA was legal and Riley's failure to disclose information that would 
have made the Opinion Letter not misleading. In a classic example of being hoisted upon one's 
own petard, Taylor raised fraud in Taylor v. AJA in an attempt to enforce the illegal contract. In 
doing so he showed intimate and exquisite knowledge of the factual underpinnings of his present 
fraud claim dating back as far as 1995. For instance: 
• Taylor acknowledged that AIA's balance sheets in 1995 suggested insufficient 
earned surplus, balance sheets he had access to and should have known about as 
CEO and majority shareholder; 
• Alternatively, Taylor claimed the following facts could be interpreted to show 
AIA had sufficient earned surplus to redeem his shares in 1995 thereby making a 
shareholder vote unnecessary (the same information reviewed by Riley and 
available to Taylor): 
- appraisals from 1995 and 1996 that valued a minority interest in AIA 
Services at $2 million and $4 million, respectively; 
- a 1994 appraisal valuing the whole company at over $19 million; 
- Taylor's own valuation of the commissions and contractual relationships 
held by l1 ... IA at over $24 million in 1995; 
- AIA's projection of substantial earnings upon redeeming Taylor's shares 
and redirecting the company; and 
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• Taylor argued that Judge Brudie failed to consider the "fair market value" of AIA 
in 1995, the same value that Riley considered in preparing the Opinion Letter. 
• Taylor argued that a violation ofldaho Code§ 30-1-6 is merely a technical 
violation and does not render the SRA iHegal and unenforceable. 
Taylor v. AJA, 151 Idaho at 560,564,565,261 P.3d at 837,841,842. These arguments made in 
support of the fraud exception to illegality in Taylor v. AJA min-or the concealed "facts" alleged 
as the basis for the present fraud claim. Taylor knew the facts long before February 22, 2012. 
Taylor's legal arguments in support of the fraud exception to illegality in Taylor v. AJA 
are equally telling of his actual knowledge of the facts constituting the cmTent fraud claim. In 
that case, Taylor argued that he was fraudulently induced to enter into the SRA by the Opinion 
Letter, which opined that the Agreement did not violate any laws. Taylor v. AJA, 151 Idaho at 
566, 261 P.3d at 843. Taylor further argued that the Opinion Letter was intended to mislead and 
therefore could form the basis of fraud. Id Finally, he argued that the SRA should be enforced 
given the malfeasance of AIA Services and its attorneys in unlawfully engineering this illegal 
agreement. Taylor v. AJA, 151 Idaho at 567,261 P.3d at 844. Each of these arguments is merely 
a different way of alleging his current fraud claim. 
This Court also recognized in Taylor v. Riley (Permissive Appeal) that Taylor knew and 
in fact argued, as far back as February 6, 2009, that Riley committed fraud by failing to disclose 
facts and by issuing a clean Opinion Letter (i.e., one without the reasoning underlying the 
opinions). 12 
12 A "clean opinion," or an unqualified opinion, generally states standard exceptions and provides 
a clear expression o:fthe law on a certain legal question. KELLY A. LOVE, A Primer on Opinion 
Letters: Explanations and Analysis, 9 Transactions: Tenn. J. Bus. L. 67 (2007) (citing to GEORGE 
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With respect to the legality of the stock redemption, Mr. Taylor asserted that 
Messrs. Riley and Turnbow had issued an opinion letter that did not disclose any 
violation of either Idaho Code §§ 30-1-6 or 30-1-46. Mr. Taylor's response was 
as follows: 'On August 15, 1995, an opinion letter was issued to Reed Tayior 
verifying many requirements had been met by AIA Services, including, without 
limitation, that the purchase of Reed Taylor's shares was a legal transaction and 
that shareholder approval was obtained. The opinion letter was based upon the 
knowledge ofR.M. Turnbow and Richard Riley. The Opinion Letter makes no 
reference to any violations of Idaho Code § 30-1-46 or Idaho Code § 30-1-6, but 
instead merely contains the standard language contained in virtually any opinion 
letter that the enforceability of the documents could be effected [sic] by 
bankruptcy or insolvency. 
Taylor v. Riley, 157 Idaho at 330,336 P.13d at 263. (emphasis added). 
This Court established in Taylor v. AJA and in the Permissive Appeal that Taylor had 
sufficient actual knowledge to satisfy the discovery exception to the three year fraud statute of 
limitation before final judgment in Taylor v. Babbitt. 
(2) Taylor Had Constructive Knowledge of the Alleged Concealed 
Facts Before Final Judgment in Taylor v. Babbitt. 
This Comi also established in Taylor v. AJA that Taylor had constructive knowledge of 
the facts constituting his present fraud claim going back as far as 1995. As an additional basis 
for seeking enforcement of the illegal agreement, Taylor argued that he was ignorant of the facts 
relating to illegality. Taylor v. AJA, 151 Idaho at 565,261 P.3d at 842. Specifically, Taylor 
argued that: (1) he was ignorant of the existence of the earned and capital surplus limitations of 
Idaho Code § 30-1-6, the insufficient surplus, and the absence of a shareholder vote explicitly 
authorizing use of capital surplus; (2) that he was in no position to understand the circumstances 
· W. KUNEY, The Elenients of Contract Drafting with Questions and Clauses for Consideration, n. 
4 at 160 (Thomson West, 2d ed. 2006). 
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smTounding the SRA; and (3) that AIA and its attorneys were in a better position to understand 
these matters and were therefore more at fault. Id This Court determined that, if Taylor did not 
have actual knowledge of these matters, he was not justifiably ignorant of them ( and by 
implication had, at least, constructive knowledge). Id. The Court reasoned that Taylor was the 
CEO, Chairman of the Board and majority shareholder of AIA and nothing suggested he was 
justifiably ignorant as to the circumstances causing the illegality. Id. If Taylor was uninf01med 
as to the financial status of his corporation, this Comi dete1mined that was a voluntary choice on 
his pmi and was insufficient to make him an innocent pmiy to the agreement. Id. 
Taylor cannot now claim that he did not know the facts, analysis and reasoning 
underlying the Opinion Letter until February 22, 2012 because he raised all of them in contesting 
the illegality of the SRA. Taylor cannot now claim he did not know that Riley believed the 
Opinion Letter to be correct until February 22, 2012 when Taylor himself argued in 2009 that it 
was correct. Based on Taylor's position in Taylor v. AJA, he cannot now argue he did not know 
until 2012 that Riley allegedly departed from the clear meaning of the statute because Taylor 
himself argued in 2009 that departing from the statute was nothing more than a technical error 
(i.e., not fraud). Taylor cannot now argue he did not know until 2012 that Riley relied upon "fair 
value" instead of earned surplus because Taylor himself faulted Judge Brudie for failing to 
consider the fair market value of AIA. Taylor cannot now argue he did not know until 2012 that 
Riley failed to disclose his belief that AIA had sufficient earned surplus to redeem his shares 
because Taylor himself asserted numerous arguments that AIA did. 
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In light of the facts presented and argued in Taylor v. AJA in support of the fraud 
exception to the illegality doctrine, it rings hollow that Taylor did not learn of the facts 
constituting his present fraud claim until February 22, 2012. Taylor had actual or constructive 
knowledge of the facts necessary to discover his fraud claim before Taylor v. Babbitt was filed. 
His fraud claim was ripe and could have been brought in the prior litigation. 
(3) The Knowledge Necessary to Satisfy Res Judicata is Less Than 
That Needed for Accrual of the Fraud Claim. 
Taylor's alleged lack of knowledge of the "new" facts relating to fraud does not toll the 
application of res judicata to 2012. This Comt has previously examined, in the context of res 
judicata, what constitutes the degree of knowledge necessary to trigger a party's duty to bring a 
fraud claim in the first action. The requisite degree of knowledge for application of res judicata 
is less than required for the discovery exception to the fraud statute of limitation. There need 
only be knowledge that a potential claim exists, not knowledge of all facts underlying the claim. 
In Magic Valley Radiology, P.A. v. Kolouch, 123 Idaho 434,437,849 P.2d 107, 111 
(1993), the Comt examined whether the plaintiff had exercised due diligence to discover in a 
prior action the fraud claim that was the subject of a subsequent action. This Comt explained 
that this was the third lawsuit arising out of a contract dispute. In Magic Valley I the theories of 
breach of contract and to1tious conduct were litigated. Magic Valley II concerned issues of 
damages, attorney fees, and the status of security posted on appeal in Magic Valley I. Magic 
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Valley III sought to hold individuals liable for the judgment entered in the prior litigation by 
piercing the corporate veil based on fraud. 13 
Regarding the amount of knowledge needed to trigger res judicata, this Court found that 
"Magic Valley was on notice in Magic Valley I that there might be a basis to pierce the corporate 
veil of PBS to hold the Kolouchs liable." Id, 123 Idaho at 439, 849 P.2d at 112. Of note, this 
Comi determined that the knowledge needed to trigger res judicata was notice that there might 
be a basis for a claim or remedy. Id A party need not have perfect knowledge of or ce1iainty 
that a claim exists or all of the facts constituting the claim before res judicata is triggered. "A 
paiiy may set fo1ih two or more statements of a claim or defense alternatively or 
hypothetically ... " Taylor v. Riley, 157 Idaho at 334, 336 P.3d at 267. This is consistent with 
this Comi' s holding that the claim in the subsequent lawsuit is still barred even if it is based on 
different theories of liability or different facts. Taylor v. Riley, 157 Idaho at 333, 336 P.3d at 
266. 
13 The Comi held in Magic Valley III that the subsequent lawsuit arose out of the same 
transaction as the prior lawsuit, even though the theories of liability and the evidence necessary 
to prove liability, were different in the subsequent action and dismissed the corporate piercing 
claim as barred by res judicata. Magic Valley III, 123 Idaho at 438-439, 849 P.2d at 111-112. 
The three Magic Valley cases are not unlike the three cases relevant to the present matter. Magic 
Valley I is similar to Taylor v. AJA in that it sought a determination of liability based on an 
underlying contract. Magic Valley 11 is similar to Taylor v. Babbitt in that it arose out of the 
initial litigation. Magic Valley III is similar to the present action in that Taylor seeks to collect 
damages arising out of the same transaction litigated in the prior litigation and seeks the same 
damages as previously sought but from a different source and based on an alternative theory of 
liability. 
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Believing that there was fraud, knowing that the Opinion Letter opined that the SRA was 
legal, knowing that the defendants in Taylor v. AJA alleged that it was not legal, knowing that the 
Opinion Letter was clean rather than explained and knowing ( or should have known) the facts 
surrounding the lack of earned surplus and lack of a shareholder vote, Taylor could have pleaded 
(and did plead) all of his fraud related claims alternatively or hypothetically in Taylor v. Babbitt. 
Taylor was, at a minimum, on notice that there "might" be a basis for fraud before final 
judgment in Taylor v. Babbitt and he should have brought his cmTent fraud claim in that action. 
Perhaps in recognition that none of Taylor's claims can escape the application of res 
judicata, this Court noted: 
... The complaint [in Taylor v. Babbitt] alleged numerous claims against Mr. 
Riley, but the issue is not what was the substantial point or essence of the claim. 
The issue is whether the lawsuit included any claim that arose out of the same 
transaction or series of transactions as the claim asserted in this case. . .. 
Taylor v. Riley, 157 Idaho at 334,336 P.3d at 267 (underlining added). This Court ultimately 
held: 
Mr. Taylor's claim§. in this lawsuit against Mr. Riley are baiTed by the judgment 
entered in favor of Mr. Riley in Taylor v. Babbitt. 
Id, 157 Idaho at 335,336 P.3d at 268. (Underlining and bold added.) Taylor's fraud claim is 
barred by final judgment in Taylor v. Babbitt and/or final judgment in Taylor v. AJA. The 
dismissal of the fraud claim should be affirmed. 
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C. There Are Independent Grounds to Uphold the Dismissal of All of Taylor's Claims. 
1. Negligent Misrepresentation Fails on the Merits. 
This Court has stated, "[W]e expressly hold that, except in the narrow confines of a 
professional relationship involving an accountant, the tort of negligent misrepresentation is not 
recognized in Idaho." Duffin v. Idaho Corp Improvement Ass 'n., 126 Idaho 1002, 1010, 895 
P.2d 1195, 1203 (1995). See also Mannas v Moss, 143 Idaho 927, 155 P.3d 1166 (2007). This 
Court should once again resist expanding negligent misrepresentation, especially to include 
attorneys involved in preparing opinion letters addressed to non-clients. 
There are no policy or other reasons to expand negligent misrepresentation to include an 
attorney opinion giver. In the context of whether there is a claim by an opinion recipient against 
an opinion giver, this Court determined that an attorney can voluntarily assume a duty to a non-
client. Taylor, 157 Idaho at 339,336 P.3d at 273. Specifically, this Comi ruled with respect to 
the Opinion Letter at issue here, that Mr. Turnbow owed a duty of care to Taylor because he 
voluntarily unde1iook to issue the Opinion Letter stating that Taylor could rely upon it. Id. 
Having recognized a duty of care owed by an opinion giver to a non-client opinion recipient 
based on an assumed duty, there is no need to expand negligent misrepresentation into this 
context. Non-client opinion letter recipients can sue for negligence and fraud. There is no need 
to create yet another avenue for a non-client to sue an attorney. 
Negligent misrepresentation by a non-client against an attorney is not a recognized claim. 
The district court's dismissal of this claim should be affirmed. 
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2. Fraud Fails on the Merits. 
a. There is No Requisite Relationship to Support Constructive Fraud. 
Taylor cannot establish the requisite relationship between him and Riley ( or Hawley 
Troxell) for purposes of a constructive fraud claim. "An action in constructive fraud exists when 
there has been a breach of a duty arising from a relationship of trust and confidence, as in a 
fiduciary duty." Hines v. Hines, 129 Idaho 847, 853, 934 P.2d 20, 26 (1997). "Examples of 
relationships from which the law will impose fiduciary obligations on the parties include when 
the parties are: members of the same family, partners, attorney and client, executor and 
beneficiary of an estate, principal and agent, insurer and insured, or close friends." Mitchell v. 
Barendregt, 120 Idaho 837, 844, 820 P.2d 707, 714 (Ct.App. 1991). None of these special 
relationships exist between Taylor and Riley or Hawley Troxell relating to the Opinion Letter. 14 
14 Taylor attempts to forge the requisite relationship by claiming that Riley was his personal 
attorney for his 1987 divorce and certain personal financial transactions prior to leaving Eberle 
Berlin in 1999. Appellant's Brief, p. 47. Riley was not Taylor's divorce attorney at the time the 
Opinion Letter was issued. R. 902 (Eberle Berlin's representation of Taylor during his divorce 
ended in 1991). Regardless, Riley was not Taylor's attorney or in any other position of trust or 
confidence with respect to the Opinion Letter. In that context, Riley was representing AIA and 
Taylor had his own personal and independent attorneys. R. 563-564. As this Court has repeatedly 
held, "'[t]he scope of an attorney's contractual duty to a client is defined by the purposes for 
which the attorney is retained."' Taylor v. Babbitt, 149 Idaho at 845,243 P.3d at 661 (quoting 
Johnson v. Jones, 103 Idaho 702, 704, 652 P.2d 650,652 (1982)). Moreover, "[i]fthe attorney 
agrees to undertake a specific matter, the relationship terminates when that matter has been 
resolved." Berry v. McFarland, 153 Idaho 5, 9,278 P.3d 407,411 (2012). 
In Berry, this Comi affirmed the district court's holding that McFarland did not breach a 
fiduciary duty as an attorney to Jerry Berry. In late 2000 or early 2001, Berry sought legal advice 
from McFarland about whether he could protect stock from creditors by filing bankruptcy. In 
2003, McFarland and co-respondent Karen Zimmerman loaned Berry $100,000 so that he could 
purchase certain stock, and in 2006 they purchased that stock from Berry for the same price. 
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Indeed, this Court has already determined that Taylor failed to establish the necessary 
relationship with Riley and upheld the dismissal of constructive fraud for failure to state a claim. 
Taylor v. Babbitt, 149 Idaho at 846,243 P.3d at 662. Moreover, this Court's decision in Taylor 
v. Riley (Permissive Appeal) supports the lack of the requisite relationship to support 
constructive fraud. In that decision, the Court acknowledged a duty owed by an opinion giver to 
an opinion recipient based on ordinary negligence (an assumed duty). Taylor v. Riley, 157 Idaho 
at 339, 336 P.3d at 272. This Court did not do so based on a relationship of trust and confidence 
or a fiduciary relationship. 
b. Taylor Cannot Prove the Elements of Fraud. 
(1) There Are No Statements of Fact in the Opinion Letter. 
Taylor's fraud allegations are based, in paii, on alleged representations in the Opinion 
Letter that the transaction did not violate the law. However, this Comi has already determined 
that the Opinion Letter sets f mih an opinion based on interpretations of law and not a statement 
of fact and, therefore, cannot form the basis for fraud. 
[The Opinion Letter] expressed an opinion that no statute was violated by the 
Stock Redemption Agreement, an opinion cmTently postulated to the Court by 
plaintiff. Such an opinion was no more a statement of fact when expressed by 
Berry contended that McFarland breached a fiduciary duty arising from his attorney-client 
relationship with Berry when he purchased the stock from Ben-y in 2006. The Court rejected this 
argument because there was insufficient evidence to show a continuing attorney-client 
relationship from 2000 or 2001 until the stock purchase in 2006. The Court concluded that 
McFarland could not have breached a fiduciary duty because there was no attorney-client 
relationship when McFarland purchased the stock in 2006. Applying Berry here, any breach of 
fiduciary duty and constructive fraud claim must fail because there was no attorney-client 
relationship or relationship of trust and confidence between Riley and Taylor in the context of 
the Opinion Letter. 
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corporate counsel in 1995 than it is now when asserted by plaintiff. It is simply 
an opinion based on one's interpretation oflaw and cannot form the basis for a 
fraud claim. 
Taylor v. AJA, 151 Idaho at 566,261 P.3d at 843. Under either fraud or constructive fraud, 
opinions and predictions of future events, as opposed to representations of fact, cannot form the 
basis for fraud. Country Cove Development, Inc. v. May, 143 Idaho 595,601, 150 P.3d 288,294 
(2006) ( opinions and predictions cannot form the basis of a fraud claim because they do not 
speak to matters of fact); Thomas v. Med Center Physicians, P.A., 138 Idaho 200,207, 61 P.3d 
557, 564 (2002) (an action for fraud or misrepresentation will not lie for statements of future 
events). Sharp v. Idaho Investment C01p., 95 Idaho 113, 122, 504 P.2d 386,395 (1972) ("[A] 
representation consisting of [a] promise or a statement as to a future event will not serve as a 
basis for fraud, even though it was made under circumstances as to knowledge and belief which 
would give rise to an action for fraud had it related to an existing or past fact."). 
Any alleged opinion regarding the future enforceability of the SRA cannot form the basis 
for fraud. It does not speak to a matter of existing or past fact. The opinion regarding the 
legality of the SRA is merely a prediction of what the highest Court would say. See TriBar 
Opinion Committee ("TR!BAR II"), Third-Party "Closing" Opinions, 53 Bus. Law. 591, 595-596 
(1998) ("An opinion on a legal issue provides the opinion recipient with the opinion giver's 
professional judgment about how the highest court of the jurisdiction whose law is being 
addressed would appropriately resolve the issues covered by the opinion on the date of the 
opinion letter.") Such predictions do not, and cannot, constitute fraud. The most that can be said 
is that a Court subsequently disagreed with opinions regarding enforceability of the 1995 SRA. 
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Importantly, that comi found the opinion to be "inc01Tect" and specifically found that the opinion 
was not fraudulent. R. 4912. Simply by virtue of being one of the preparers of the 1995 Opinion 
Letter, Riley did not thereby become the guarantor of his client's ability or willingness to 
perform or of how a future court would rule on the legality of the SRA. Taylor cannot prove that 
the Opinion Letter made actionable statements of fact; accordingly both fraud and constructive 
fraud fail as to the first element of fraud. 
In an effmi to evade the Taylor v. AJA ruling that the Opinion Letter expresses opinions 
and not statements of fact, Taylor now claims that Riley fraudulently concealed "facts" that 
would have made the Opinion Letter not misleading, concealed that he felt the Opinion Letter 
was correct, and failed to provide the reasoning behind his opinions. (Appellant's Brief, p. 27.) 
The allegedly concealed facts are not "facts"; Riley's belief that the Opinion Letter was true, 
accurate or con-ect is an opinion, not a fact; and choosing whether to issue a clean versus 
reasoned opinion is not fraud. 
( a) The Alleged Concealments are Not of Facts. 
In summary, Taylor argues that Riley (and Hawley Troxell) concealed the following 
"facts" until February 2012: 
1. The Opinion Letter was and is believed by Riley to be a correct, fair and 
objective opinion; 
2. Riley concluded that AIA could not later disavow its obligations to Reed Taylor; 
3. Riley found no Idaho cases addressing the statutory restrictions on distributions to 
shareholders; 
4. Riley researched and found no explanation of "earned surplus"; 
5. Riley concluded that the corporation had sufficient net assets to satisfy statutory 
restriction~ on redemption as construed in light of RMBCA 6.40; 
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6. RMBCA 6.40 expressly provides that the board of directors may determine that a 
distribution is not prohibited on the basis of fair value and other methods of 
valuation; 
7. Using a "fair value" of AIA assets complied with statutory requirements; and 
8. Riley opined that a shareholder vote authorizing the use of capital surplus was not 
necessary to comply with the statute. 
Appellant's Brief, p. 28. None of these are facts. They are beliefs or conclusions reflecting an 
exercise of professional judgment. They describe research done to reach the conclusions, beliefs 
and opinions. They describe the legal analysis completed to come to these conclusions, beliefs 
and opinions. These are the underlying information upon which the opinions are based. Because 
they are not facts, none of these can form the basis for fraud, whether it is characterized as 
fraudulent inducement, constructive fraud or fraudulent concealment. 
(b) Whether or Not an Opinion Giver Believes the Opinion to 
be Correct is Not an Actionable Representation of Fact. 
Taylor claims that Riley (with Hawley Troxell's assistance) failed to disclose until 
February 2012 that Riley believed the Opinion Letter to be correct. Riley's belief that the 
Opinion Letter was c01Tect is not a fact, nor is it necessary to make it not misleading. It is a 
belief or opinion, neither of which can form the basis for fraud whether it is labeled fraudulent 
inducement, constructive fraud or fraudulent concealment. 
(c) The Alleged Concealment of the Analysis or Reasoning 
Behind the Opinion Letter Cannot Fmm the Basis for 
Fraud. 
Taylor claims that Riley concealed from him the basis and reasoning necessary to make 
the Opinion Letter not misleading. Taylor argues that the opinions should have been reasoned 
opinions rather than clean opinions. A clean opinion does not disclose the reasoning, research or 
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analysis used to reach the opinions. This "undisclosed information" is merely the basis of the 
opinions given, not representations or omissions of fact. Whether to issue a clean or reasoned 
opinion is a matter of professional judgment. TRIBAR II, 53 Bus. Law. at 607 ("A reasoned ( or 
'explained') opinion is typically rendered when, in the view of the opinion giver, the opinion's 
conclusions should not be stated apart from its underlying reasoning ... "). While incon-ect 
opinions and underlying reasoning, research and analysis may be a basis for a negligence claim, 
failure to disclose the reasoning does not transform the negligence into fraud. Choosing to issue 
a clean opinion cannot be the basis for fraud. Therefore, "concealing" the reasoning cannot be 
the basis for fraud. 
(2) Neither the Opinions Nor the Allegedly Concealed Facts and 
Reasoning are False. 
An opinion giver is not liable merely for being wrong. Lucas v. Hamm, 364 P.2d 685, 
689 (Cal. 1961 ). The recipient of an opinion letter has no claim for negligence or fraud simply 
because the opinions given prove to be incon-ect. Donald W. Glazer, et al., Glazer and 
FitzGibbon on Legal Opinions: Drafting, lnte,preting and Supporting Closing Opinions in 
Business Transactions §§ I. I, 1.2.1 (3d ed). Legal opinions are expressions of professional 
judgment, not guarantees that a court will reach the same conclusion as the opinion giver. 
Washington Electric Co-Op, Inc. v. Massachusetts Municipal Wholesale Electric Co., 894 
F.Supp. 777, 790 (D. Ver. 1995). 
On June 17, 2009, nearly 14 years after the Opinion Letter was issued, the district court 
determined that the Opinion Letter was "incorrect." R. 4912. This finding did not make the 
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Opinion Letter fraudulent or even negligent. In fact, the district court and this Court determined 
it was not fraudulent. Taylor v. AJA, 151 Idaho at 566,261 P.3d at 843. Ifan opinion is 
incorrect, then presumably so is the underlying reasoning, research and analysis. Disclosing that 
information would not change the outcome; and failing to disclose it is not fraud. 
(3) Riley Did Not Know Any of His Opinions or the Underlying 
Reasoning, Research or Analysis Were False. 
Being incorrect does not make the opinions false or fraudulent. Id. When the Opinion 
Letter was issued, Riley had no knowledge or belief that it was incorrect, let alone false. R. 2936. 
As Taylor states, even in February 2012 Riley believed, in 1995, that the opinions and 
underlying reasoning, research and analysis were correct. Appellant's Brief, p. 28. 
(4) Riley Did Not Intend to Induce Reliance by Taylor on Any False 
Statements. 
The speaker's intent to induce reliance has already been decided against Taylor. In 
Taylor v. AJA, this Court rejected Taylor's argument that he had been fraudulently induced by 
AIA or its attorneys to enter into the SRA by the Opinion Letter. Taylor v. AJA, 151 Idaho at 
566,261 P.3d at 843. Indeed, this Court determined that there was nothing in the record 
suggesting that anyone intended to mislead Taylor with the Opinion Letter. Id. 
(5) Taylor was Not Ignorant of Any Falsity of Any Allegedly 
Concealed Facts and He Had No Right to Rely on Them. 
With respect to other elements of fraud- the hearer's ignorance of the falsity of the 
statement of fact and reliance by the hearer - this Court has already ruled that these elements do 
not exist. This Comi determined that Taylor was not justifiably ignorant as to the circumstances 
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causing the illegality - the insufficient earned surplus and absence of a shareholder vote -
because he was CEO and Chairman of the Board, as well as majority shareholder of AIA. 
Taylor v. AJA, 151 Idaho at 565-566, 261 P.3d at 842-843. This Court affirmed the district 
court's ruling that: 
This is not a case where the parties to the agreement are in pari delicto . . . If 
Reed Taylor was uninformed as to the financial status of his corporation, that was 
a voluntary choice on his part and is insufficient to make him an innocent party to 
the agreement. 
Id, 151 Idaho at 566,261 P.3d at 843. 
Taylor cannot prove all of the elements of fraud and this claim fails on the merits. 
c. Neither Riley Nor Hawley Troxell Owed Any Duty to Taylor After 
Issuance of the Opinion Letter. 
Taylor seeks to create a new and different fraud claim and extend the scope of opinion-
giver duties owed based on an alleged continuing duty to disclose to Taylor the facts, bases and 
reasoning necessary to clarify the allegedly misleading Opinion Letter; which duty allegedly 
continued from issuance of the Opinion Letter in 1995 until February 2012. Appellant's Brief, p. 
36. Taylor argues that Riley and Hawley Troxell breached this continuing duty by refusing in 
Taylor v. AJA or Taylor v. Babbitt to provide Riley for deposition, refusing to respond to written 
discovery, and refusing to supp01i his effo1is to prove the SRA was legal. Jd. 15 Taylor fails to 
15 Taylor either failed to pursue discovery efforts or the district comis in Taylor v. AJA, Taylor v. 
Babbitt and Taylor v. Riley denied Taylor's discovery eff01is, entered protective orders against 
those discovery efforts or stayed the action, thereby ratifying any action taken with respect to 
discovery. R. 2734, 2735, 3529. It cannot be fraud or breach of a fiduciary duty to do that which 
is sanctioned by a court. 
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provide any legal authority or factual basis for this continuing duty. Indeed, no such duty exists; 
and the Opinion Letter itself disclaims assumption of any such duty. 
There is no continuing duty when the duty owed is an assumed duty and the duty 
assumed is limited. "Although a person can assume a duty to act on a particular occasion, the 
duty is limited to the discrete episode in which the aid is rendered." Udy v. Custer County, 136 
Idaho 386,389, 34 P.3d 1069, 1072 (2001) (citations omitted). "In other words, past voluntary 
acts do not entitle the benefited party to expect assistance on future occasions, at least in the 
absence of an express promise that future assistance will be forthcoming." Id., 136 Idaho at 390, 
34 P.3d at 1073 (citations omitted). See also Stoddart v. Pocatello School District# 25, 149 
Idaho 679,687,239 P.3d 784, 792 (2010) ("To the extent that there was an assumption of a duty 
by way of the investigation in 2004, that investigation concerned the threat by Draper to commit 
a school shooting then, with C.N. The School District did not assume an ongoing duty to 
monitor Draper's potential involvement in a future school shooting, much less a crime that might 
be committed away from school grounds.") 
"When a paiiy assumes a duty by voluntarily performing an act that the party had 
no duty to perform, the duty that arises is limited to the duty actually assumed." 
Martin v. Twin Falls School Dist. No. 411, 13 8 Idaho 146, 150, 59 P .3d 317, 321 
(2002). Thus, merely because a paiiy acts once does not mean that party is 
forever duty-bound to act in a similar fashion. A beach-goer may assume a duty 
to rescue a drowning swimmer in a non-negligent manner by undertaking to do 
so, but that same beach-goer has no obligation to rescue anyone else. In Martin, 
the school district was not required to post crossing guards at every school 
crossing even though it had provided crossing guards at certain crossings. Thus, 
although a party may assume a duty by unde1iaking an act, that duty is limited to 
the scope of the undertaking. 
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Beers v. Corporation of President of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, 155 Idaho 680, 
688,316 P.3d 92, 100 (2013). 
The only duty assumed by Riley or any other attorney involved with the Opinion Letter 
was an assumed duty to issue a non-negligent Opinion Letter. Taylor v. Riley, 157 Idaho at 339, 
336 P.3d at 272. There was no assumption of any other duty, fiduciary or otherwise. In fact, the 
Opinion Letter expressly disclaims assumption of any duty after the Opinion Letter was issued: 
We assume no responsibility for updating this opinion to take into account any 
event, action, interpretation or change of law occunfog subsequently to the date 
hereof that may affect the validity of any of the opinions expressed herein. 
R. 827. There was no assumed duty to disclose the facts, reasoning or analysis underlying the 
Opinion Letter after it was issued. There was no duty assumed or owed to take or refrain from 
taking any action for the benefit of Taylor. There was no duty assumed or owed to make Riley 
available for deposition, respond to written discovery or assist Taylor in any of his numerous 
lawsuits. None of Taylor's claims can be based on an alleged breach of any duty that supposedly 
arose after the 1995 Opinion Letter was issued. 
Regardless, Taylor is barred by res judicata and collateral estoppel from relitigating any 
claim based on a continuing duty. Taylor alleged in the prior lawsuit (Taylor v. Babbitt) that 
Riley owed a continuing duty to him. In Taylor's Motion to Amend the Complaint in that action, 
Taylor alleged "defendant Riley owes Reed Taylor special duties by and through an opinion 
letter. Riley breached his duties when he asserted that the transaction was illegal." R. 470. 
Taylor thereby alleged a continuing duty not to take positions contrary to the Opinion Letter. R. 
47. 
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These prior allegations of a breach of a continuing duty owed to Taylor were based on 
Riley and Hawley Troxell's litigation conduct in Taylor v. Babbitt (an alleged duty not to take 
inconsistent positions). Taylor is now arguing in the present suit that Riley and Hawley Troxell 
breached a continuing duty based on different litigation conduct (failing to make Riley available 
for deposition, failing to respond to written discovery and failing to assist in avoiding the 
illegality of the SRA). Simply alleging different facts or a different legal theory does not save 
this continuing duty basis for his present claims from the bar of res judicata or collateral 
estoppel. 
Taylor was fully aware, while Taylor v. Babbitt was pending, of the facts necessary to 
raise these newest claims of breach of continuing duty owed to Taylor. Taylor could have 
brought these claims in the prior litigation and his failure to do so bars him from, doing so in the 
present litigation. 
3. Breach of Fiduciary Duty Fails on the Merits. 
The same reasons discussed above relating to Taylor's failure to establish the requisite 
relationship for constructive fraud applies equally to breach of fiduciary duty. This Comi ruled 
in Taylor v. Babbitt that Taylor failed to establish that Riley owed him a fiduciary duty. Taylor 
v. Babbitt, 149 Idaho at 845,243 P.3d at 661. Fmiher, this Court found in Taylor v. Riley 
(Permissive Appeal) that only an ordinary duty of care was owed by Eberle Berlin to Taylor. 
Taylor v. Riley, 157 Idaho at 339,336 P.3d at 272. At most, this would be the only duty Riley 
would owe. As the district comi reasoned, the mere fact that the law allows a negligence action 
to be filed against an attorney does not mean the relationship is expanded to a fiduciary one. R. 
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1689. An opinion giver has a duty to act without negligence; but issuing an Opinion Letter does 
not create any duty beyond that. Id. This holding and analysis should be affirmed. 
Moreover, "[a]ttorneys owe fundamental duties to their clients. Among the most 
important of these duties are the duties of zealous representation and loyalty." Heinze v. Bauer, 
145 Idaho 232,238, 178 P.3d 597, 603 (2008). Creating a fiduciary relationship to a non-client 
in the context of an attorney providing legal services to a client would create a conflict of interest 
between an attorney's duty to his client and the attorney's duty to the third paiiy non-client, 
thereby limiting the attorney's ability to zealously represent his or her client. Barcello v. Elliott, 
923 S.W.2.d 975,580 (Texas 996). In Garcia v. Rodey, Dickason, Sloan, Akin & Robb, 750 P.2d 
118 (1988), the court rejected plaintiffs attempt to allege causes of action for constructive fraud 
and other to1is based on counsel's statements upon which a litigation adversary allegedly relied 
to his detriment. The comi found that imposition of the requisite legal or equitable duty to the 
plaintiff "would be contrai·y to an attorney's duty to represent his client and pursue his client's 
interests with undivided loyalty." Id., 750 P.2d at 124. Those duties would be irrevocably 
compromised if attorneys were required to temper their representation but take into account the 
economic or other interests of third parties. As this Comi held in Taylor v. Babbitt, "[I]t is 
incredulous that Reed would attempt to assert that attorneys hired by the AIA Entities, to fight 
off Reed's litigation against those entities, were being retained for Reed's benefit." Taylor v. 
Babbitt, 149 Idaho at 845, 243 P.3d at 661. Imposing fiduciary duties or expanding constructive 
fraud to non-clients would give rise to increased lawsuits and cause attorneys to practice in a 
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manner calculated to protect themselves rather than advance the interests of their clients. The 
dismissal of breach of fiduciary duty should be affirmed. 
4. All Claims Alleged Against Hawley Troxell Fail as a Matter of Law. 
In the present action, Taylor alleges Hawley Troxell is vicariously liable for the acts 
and/or omissions of Riley. R. 25. The district court dismissed all claims against Hawley Troxell 
relating to the issuance of the Opinion Letter on the undisputed grounds that Riley was not an 
employee, agent or principal of Hawley Troxell at the time the Opinion Letter was issued. 
R. 1680-81. Vicarious liability cannot apply to acts or omissions which occur when there is no 
relationship whatsoever between the paiiies. Id. Taylor concedes that Hawley Troxell is not 
vicariously liable for Riley's acts at the time of the Opinion Letter. Appellant's Brief, p. 48. 
The district comi also dismissed all claims against Hawley Troxell grounded on taking a 
litigation position in Taylor v. AJA contrary to the Opinion Letter as ban-ed by res judicata. 
R. 1689. For the reasons discussed supra, all claims alleged against Riley are ban-ed by the final 
judgments in Taylor v. AJA and Taylor v. Babbitt and, therefore, all vicarious liability claims 
against Hawley Troxell are barred. 
Taylor now asks this Comito reverse the dismissal of the vicarious liability claims 
against Hawley Troxell based on Riley's breaches of continuing duties owed to Taylor to 
disclose facts, bases and reasoning to make the Opinion Letter not misleading during the course 
of Taylor v. AJA, especially because Hawley Troxell took affirmative action to prevent Taylor 
from getting this information. Appellant's Brief, p. 48. As discussed above, this new vicarious 
liability theory also fails. 
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D. The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion Regarding the Amount of the 
Attorney Fees Awards. 
On appeal, Taylor does not seek to overturn the district couit's awards of attor11ey fees 
against him (unless he prevails on appeal). He appeals the amount of attorney fees awarded. 
The district court already significantly reduced the amount of the attorney fees sought. R. 5824. 
Riley sought an award of attorney fees in the amount of $302,328.75. R. 5070. The district comi 
reduced that amount to $175,000.00. R. 5822-24. Hawley Troxell sought attorney fees in the 
amount of $40,243.75. R. 4214. The district comi awarded $28,750.00. R. 5821-22. Taylor 
seeks a fu1iher reduction of the award of attorney fees. Given the abuse of discretion standard 
and the prior substantial reduction in the amount of attorney fees awarded, the amount awarded 
should be affomed. 
Taylor cannot show that the district court awarded fees that "included a substantial 
amount of fees that were not 'reasonably incmTed' by Riley or Hawley Troxell .... " 
Appellant's Brief, p. 50. Taylor cannot show that the district court's reduction did not already 
reduce or deny attorney fees allegedly not reasonably incurred. Unable to make this showing, 
Taylor cannot show that the district comi abused its discretion in fixing the amount of attorney 
fees awarded. 
Nor can Taylor show that the amount awarded included attorney fees incurred defending 
against the Consumer Protection Act claim. The district court expressly declined to award fees 
under this statute. R. 5823. 
58 
Taylor also claims the district court abused its discretion by apportioning attorney fees 
50/50 between Riley and Hawley Troxell for that period of time before Hawley Troxell was 
dismissed. Appellant's Brief, p. 52. There was no abuse of discretion in apportioning in this 
manner. Taylor claimed that Hawley Troxell was vicariously liable for Riley's actions. The 
defense of the claims against Riley inured to the benefit of the defense of Hawley Troxell. 
Regardless, Taylor suffered no prejudice or hann by a 50/50 apportionment. The district court 
could have apportioned attorney fees in a different manner (i.e., 7 5/25 or 90/10) but Taylor 
would still have paid the same total amount of attorney fees. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Riley and Hawley Troxell request that this Court affam the district court's dismissal of 
all claims against them, affom the award of attorney fees by the district court and award attorney 
fees on appeal. 
3 DATED this ___ day of January, 2017. 
By: _/~--,.-----.,<--2_-" __ 
Iefffe A. Thomson, Of the firm 
Att&neys for Defendants/Respondents 
R,ihard A. Riley and Hawley Troxell Ennis 
!Hawley LLP 
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